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1 Introduction
The aim of this study consists in exploring some new ways of representing
and discerning information embodied in our epistemic states. It is based on a
presupposition that epistemic state is much more than just a set of propositions.
It is a structured entity in which propositions are organized in a tight net of
dependencies and justifications.
In previous publications I have suggested to formalize this notion of an epis-
temic state as follows.
Definition. An epistemic state is a triple E = (S, l,≺),where S is a set of belief
states, ≺ a preference relation on S, l a valuation function: for every s ∈ S,
I(s) is a deductively closed belief set of s.
Definition. A is believed in an epistemic state E ≡ A holds in all preferred
states of E.
Traditional models in belief change theory presuppose, however, that an
epistemic state is determinate, that is, it always has a unique most preferred
belief state. But though many epistemic states are determinate, there are also
important cases where they are not. Moreover, it has been shown in [Boc01] that
the restriction to determinate epistemic states leads to inevitable difficulties in
describing the general process of belief change. That is why we are interested
in this study in developing new formal means for dealing with non-determinate
states.
2 Multiple contraction
The first belief function on epistemic states we will consider generalizes the usual
belief contraction to an operation that may have multiple conclusions:
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Definition. a a b is valid in an epistemic state if every preferred belief state
that does not contain any proposition from a includes at least one proposition
from b.
As can be seen from the above definition, if an epistemic state is not deter-
minate, then A a B,C implies that B ∨ C will belong to the contracted belief
set E − A, but not vice versa. Accordingly, multiple contraction is a more ex-
pressive operation that allows us to make fine-grained distinctions concerning
the relations among propositions in an epistemic state.
It turns out that multiple contraction operation can be axiomatized as fol-
lows:
Tautology a a t
Monotony If a a b, then a a b, c.
Weakening If B  C and a a b, B, then A a b, C.
And If a a b, A and a a b, B, then a a b, B ∧ C.
Success If a,A a b, A, then a,A a b.
Export If a,A a b, then a a A, b.
Import If a a A → a and a a b, then a,A a b, where A → a = {A → Ai |
Ai ∈ a}.
3 Choice contraction
Taking seriously the idea that an epistemic state may have multiple preferred
belief states, it is only a short step to concluding that propositions holding in at
least one preferred belief state function as default assumptions in our reasoning.
This justifies the following definition.
Definition. A is an assumption (an expectation, default) in an epistemic state
E ≡ A holds in at least one preferred state from E.
〈E〉 – the assumption set of E = the union of all preferred belief sets.
It seems clear that the contraction operation on epistemic states (as defined
in [Boc01]) produces also a certain change in its assumptions. Formally, it is
defined as follows.
〈E〉 −A = 〈E−A〉
B ∈ 〈E−A〉 ≡ B holds in at least one preferred state not containing A.
It turns out that this operation is also axiomatizable. Moreover, its axiom-
atization is much similar to the axiomatization of ordinary contractions.
Success A /∈ 〈E−A〉
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Weak Closure If B  C and B ∈ 〈E−A〉, then C ∈ 〈E−A〉.
Extensionality If  A↔ B, then 〈E−A〉 = 〈E−B〉.
Distributivity 〈E−A ∧B〉 ⊆ 〈E−A〉 ∪ 〈E−B〉.
Conjunction If A /∈ 〈E−B〉, then 〈E−A ∧B〉 = 〈E−B〉.
Basically, the distinction between ordinary and choice contractions boils
down to weakening the claim that the contracted set should be deductively
closed. Instead, we have only Weak Closure for choice contractions.
4 Dependence
Belief contraction functions reflect in some sense the notion of independence
of propositions belonging to an epistemic state. Indeed, if B belongs to the
belief set resulting from contracting an epistemic state with respect to A, then
B can be seen as independent of A. The connection between contraction and
(in)dependence of propositions has already been used in [CH96].
It turns out however, that ordinary belief contraction, though adequate for
independence, allows us to define only a very weak notion of dependence among
propositions. A better notion of dependence can be defined using the above
notion of choice contraction.
Dependence relation B B A ≡ A 6∼|B - B strongly depends on A in the
epistemic state.
Definition. B BA is valid in E if B does not hold in any preferred state that
does not contain A.
Using the above axiomatization of the choice contraction, we immediately
obtain the following axiomatization of strong dependence:
Reflexivity ABA
Left Strengthening If B  C and C BA, then B BA.
Extensionality If  A↔ C and B B C, then B BA.
Cut If ABB and C BA ∧B, then C BA.
Cumulativity If ABB and A ∧B B C, then ABB ∧ C.
Below we list some interesting properties of this new notion of dependence.
1. (And) If ABB and AB C, then ABB ∧ C.
2. If ABB, then C ∧AB C ∧B;
3. If ABB and B B C, then ABB ∧ C.
4. If ABA ∧B and B BB ∧ C, then ABA ∧ C.
5. If ABB and B BA, then C BA iff C BB.
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